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FOMC Consensus Forecasts
William T. Gavin and Geetanjali Pande
In November 2007, the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) announced a change in the way
it communicates its view of the economic outlook: It increased the frequency of its forecasts from
two to four times per year, and it increased the length of the forecasting horizon from two to three
years. The FOMC does not release the individual members’ forecasts or standard measures of
consensus such as the mean or median. Rather, it continues to release the forecast information as
a range of forecasts, both the full range between the high and the low and a central tendency that
omits the extreme values. This paper uses individual forecaster data from the Survey of Professional
Forecasters (SPF) to mimic the FOMC’s method for creating their central tendency. The authors
show that the midpoint of the central tendency of the SPF is a reliable measure of the consensus,
suggesting that the FOMC reporting method is also a reliable measure of consensus. For the dates
when both are available, the authors also compare the relative forecast accuracy of the FOMC and
SPF consensus forecasts for output growth and inflation. Overall, the differences in forecast
accuracy are too small to be statistically significant. (JEL C42, E17, E37, E52)
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these calendar years with the minutes of FOMC
meetings held in January, March, and June. At
the October 2008 FOMC meeting, they will
extend the forecasts to 2011. The projections
will be supplemented with summaries and
explanations of the projections, including more
information about the dispersion of views among
the FOMC participants. This change was made
to improve communication about monetary
I
n a November 14, 2007, press release, the
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC)
announced a change in the way it commu-
nicates its view of the economic outlook.
With the release of the minutes of the FOMC
meeting of October 30-31 was a Summary of
Economic Projections that included explicit
multiyear forecasts for real gross domestic
product (GDP), the fourth-quarter average
unemployment rate, and two measures of con-
sumer price inflation—the chain price index for
personal consumption expenditures (PCEPI) and
the same measure excluding food and energy
(core PCEPI).1 The FOMC also added a 3-year-
ahead forecast. For the October meeting, they
made forecasts for calendar years 2007 through
2010. The FOMC will release projections for
1 We use the term “projection” interchangeably with “forecast.”
There is a technical distinction: a projection is based on a policy
assumption that may or may not also be the policy that the fore-
caster expects. Each FOMC participant conditions his or her
assumption about “appropriate” monetary policy. This can be
different for each participant and may be different from the policy
that is actually expected. Note also that the Federal Reserve Board
staff “Greenbook” forecasts were often based on a federal funds
rate path that was constrained to be different from the one that
the staff expected.
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of the policy process.2
Currently, the FOMC issues a statement fol-
lowing each policy meeting that contains a deci-
sion about the federal funds rate target and a brief
analysis of the economic risks as seen by policy-
makers. Market observers monitor these state-
ments closely, looking for clues about future
policy moves and the FOMC’s beliefs about the
economic outlook. Sack (2007) describes a recent
survey in which Macroeconomic Advisors LLC
asked 61 “very active players” in the fixed income
market what changes they would like to see in
the Fed’s economic forecast.3 They replied that
they would like more of everything—more vari-
ables to be forecasted, forecasts of more years
out into the future, and more details and insights
about the reasons for the changes in the forecasts.
The enhanced projection process should help to
quantify the risks and explain the nature of
uncertainty in the policy statement.
FOMC forecasts are important because they
contain information about the FOMC policy pref-
erences. Most important of these is the FOMC’s
implicit inflation objective. Monetary policy is the
main factor determining inflation in the long run.
The near-term outlook for inflation is affected by
all the economic shocks hitting the economy. But
the aggregate effects of such shocks decay quite
rapidly if they are not accommodated by monetary
policy. The newly available 3-year-ahead forecast
adds more information about the FOMC’s desired
inflation objective because, as the horizon gets
longer, the forecast becomes more a projection of
these preferences. For the near term, the forecasts
provide a benchmark for gauging how policy-
makers respond to news about inflation, output,
and unemployment. The policy reactions and
accompanying narrative help the public under-
stand how the FOMC believes that policy affects
the economy.
The forecasts also provide information about
the FOMC’s assessment of the state of the econ-
omy—assessment of the trend growth of real GDP
and the natural rate of unemployment and the
stage of the business cycle around these trends.
This information is important for the market’s
assessment of the equilibrium real interest rate
and the real effects of policy actions.
The information gleaned from FOMC forecasts
is important for Wall Street because it provides a
frame of reference for the expected neutral federal
funds rate—the rate that is expected to prevail in
a world with full employment and price stability.
Forecasters can make better forecasts in the short
run if they know the long-run trends. Knowledge
of the long-run trends is also important for Main
Street to help set prices in wage and supply con-
tracts and to know what interest rates are appro-
priate when making savings and investment
decisions.
The FOMC projections are made by the indi-
vidual Federal Reserve Bank presidents and
Federal Reserve governors. The new forecast
information includes histograms showing the
distribution of the individual forecasts. The Fed
reports two summary statistics: the full range
(the high and the low for each variable) as well
as a smaller range (called the central tendency)
that eliminates the three high and the three low
forecasts, but does not include the mean, median,
or the actual forecasts.4 In this study, we define
the FOMC “consensus” forecasts as the midpoints
of the reported ranges.
The primary goal of this article is to evaluate
the reliability of the midpoint of the central ten-
dency as a measure of consensus. We do this by
replicating the Fed’s reporting method using the
individual responses in the Survey of Professional
Forecasters (SPF). That is, we construct the range
and central tendency of the SPF individual fore-
casts and compare the midpoint of these ranges
with the traditional measures of consensus—the
median and mean response. This comparison is
intended to determine whether the midpoint of
the range serves as an accurate proxy for the mean
and/or median. The second goal is to compare
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2 Bernanke (2007) discusses the rationale for making these changes.
The minutes of the October 30-31, 2007, meeting also reported
evidence from Reifschneider and Tulip (2007) about the uncertainty
in the forecasts based on the history of various forecasts made
between 1986 and 2006.
3 See Sack (2007).
4 See footnote 6 in Bernanke (2007).the accuracy of FOMC consensus forecasts with
the SPF consensus forecasts.
PREVIOUS STUDIES OF FOMC
FORECASTS
Although there are many studies of the Board
staff’s Greenbook forecast, there are only a few
studies that analyze the biannual FOMC forecasts
directly.5 The first study was McNees (1995),
which tabulated how often the actual forecast fell
within each of the two intervals, the full range and
the central tendency. Generally, he found that the
FOMC was more likely to be successful (that is,
have the actual outcome fall within the forecast
intervals) when the value used to measure the
outcome was the first published figure and the
forecast horizon was longer. He concluded that,
although inherent uncertainty in the forecast rose
with the length of the forecast horizon, dispersion
among the FOMC member forecasts rose even
faster, so that the outcome was more likely to fall
within the forecast range.
Gavin and Mandal (2003) use the midpoint
of the range as a consensus FOMC forecast. They
compare these point forecasts of output and infla-
tion with the Blue Chip consensus. They conclude
that the Blue Chip consensus closely matches
the FOMC’s central tendency forecasts; and, for
1983-94, the Blue Chip consensus was as good as
or a better match for the FOMC forecasts than were
the Federal Reserve Board staff Greenbook fore-
casts. In the early years, the Blue Chip consensus
real GDP growth forecast was at least as accurate
as the FOMC forecast, but the inflation forecast
was less accurate. These results will differ from
others for two reasons. First, as we also do in
this study, Gavin and Mandal (2003) define the
FOMC’s consensus inflation forecast as the differ-
ence between the midpoint of the range for nomi-
nal output minus the midpoint of the range for
real output. Second, as in this study, they use the
first-released data as the “truth” against which
the forecasts were measured.
Gavin (2003) describes the history and detail
of the FOMC forecasts and shows that there is not
much difference between the midpoints of the
full range and the central tendency. He also shows
that disagreement among the FOMC members’
inflation forecasts rose with the length of the
forecast horizon, suggesting that, although the
Committee had reached a consensus on the impor-
tance of the long-term price stability objective,
they had not reached a consensus on how that
long-term price stability objective mapped into a
numeric inflation rate.
Gavin and Mandal (2001) show that a forward-
looking Taylor rule estimated using FOMC fore-
casts of output and inflation fits the interest rate
data quite well, but no better than one using the
Blue Chip forecasts. Levy and Kretzmer (2006)
provide a historical description of the FOMC fore-
casts, comparing the forecasts with those of the
Greenbook. They use regression analysis to esti-
mate how the FOMC changed the federal funds
rate target in reaction to errors in its forecasts.
Orphanides and Wieland (2007) also use regres-
sion analysis to estimate FOMC reaction functions
that use the FOMC consensus forecasts for infla-
tion and unemployment. They find that using the
FOMC forecasts in forward-looking Taylor rules
fit the historical federal funds rate data better than
in backward-looking versions that rely on recent
economic outcomes. Romer and Romer (2007) use
forecast combination methods to test whether
the FOMC forecasts added useful information to
the Greenbook forecasts: They find that knowing
the FOMC forecasts did add useful information
to the Greenbook forecasts for output growth, but
not for inflation or the unemployment rate.
Other studies have used the size of the range
of FOMC forecasts as a measure of uncertainty.
Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers (2003) show that the
size of the FOMC’s range and truncated central
tendency are correlated with measures of uncer-
tainty in private sector forecasts. Dowd (2004)
tests and rejects the assumption that the FOMC
forecasts are independent random draws from a
common density function. Although he does not
discuss alternative interpretations, a more accu-
Gavin and Pande
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5 An early study of Greenbook forecasts was Lombra and Moran
(1980). A sample of studies since then includes Karamouzis and
Lombra (1989), Jansen and Kishan (1996), Romer and Romer
(2000), Joutz and Stekler (2000), Gavin and Mandal (2003), and
Baghestani (2008).rate view is that the forecasts are individual esti-
mates of the mean of an uncertain distribution.
Rich and Tracey (2006) use the SPF forecasts,
which include probability densities for the indi-
vidual forecasts of inflation and output, to address
this issue directly. With the new FOMC forecasting
process, the Summary of Economic Projections




Fed policymakers began reporting economic
projections to Congress in response to require-
ments of Section 108 of the 1979 Humphrey-
Hawkins Act. The first report was made in July
1979.6 Since then, similar summaries of forecasts
have been reported every February and July. The
FOMC members made forecasts of annual, fourth-
quarter-over-fourth-quarter growth rates for nomi-
nal GDP, real GDP, and inflation.7 They also
forecasted the average level of unemployment
for the fourth quarter of the year. In February, the
forecasts pertain to the current calendar year (also
referred to below, simply, as the 12-month-ahead
forecasts) and, since 2005, also to the next calen-
dar year (24-month-ahead forecasts). In July, fore-
casts are updated for the current calendar year
(6-month-ahead forecasts) and preliminary pro-
jections are made for the next calendar year (18-
month-ahead forecasts). From these reports, we
can construct “consensus” forecasts based on the
midpoint of the respective intervals—the full
range and the central tendency.
The Private-Sector Forecasts
The Blue Chip Consensus. Most of the work
comparing the FOMC policymaker forecasts with
private sector forecasts has been done using the
Blue Chip consensus forecasts, which are updat-
ed every month and, therefore, can be closely
aligned with FOMC forecasts made at the end
of January and June. However, the Blue Chip
does not maintain records of individual fourth-
quarter-over-fourth-quarter forecasts that are
needed to simulate the FOMC reporting method.
Therefore, we use the SPF data for this analysis.
However, the SPF makes forecasts in February,
May, August, and November, and so it is not
possible to align any of these forecasts with the
FOMC policymaker forecasts that are made at
the end of June. Consequently, we restrict the
comparison to the 12-month-ahead forecast—
which matches the FOMC’s February forecasts.
The SPF. The SPF is a quarterly survey
started by the American Statistical Association
and the National Bureau of Economic Research
in 1968; since the second quarter of 1990, it has
been conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia. The survey presents consensus
forecasts, as well as individual and probabilistic
forecasts, for variables including real output
and inflation. As noted, forecasts are made in
February, May, August, and November of each
year and provide predicted values of variables
for the current quarter and the next four quarters,
as well as annual averages for the current and
following year. Although the real GDP forecasts
(real GNP before 1992) and GDP price index fore-
casts are for quarterly and annual average levels,
consumer price index (CPI) forecasts are for
annualized quarter-over-quarter percent changes
in the quarterly horizon and fourth-quarter-over-
fourth-quarter percent changes in the annual
horizon. Beginning in the first quarter of 2007, the
forecast horizon for CPI inflation was extended
to report the fourth-quarter-over-fourth-quarter
percent change for the current year and next two
years.
The SPF’s February reports serve as our source
for the 12-month-ahead forecasts of real output
and inflation. Like the FOMC members, the SPF
respondents would have had information about
fourth-quarter GDP in hand when they made this
forecast. Here, we construct a central tendency
range for the SPF. Because the SPF often includes
more than 19 forecasts (the maximum number
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6 The reporting requirements of the Humphrey-Hawkins Act
expired in May 2000. The Congress amended and continued the
reporting requirements in the American Homeownership and
Economic Opportunity Act of 2000 (Section 1003).
7 The Fed followed the Bureau of Economic Analysis, switching
from GNP to GDP in 1992.possible for the Fed policy group), we compute
the central tendency by eliminating two outliers
(one high and one low) for every six forecasts.
For a group the size of the FOMC, this is compa-
rable to eliminating the top and bottom three
forecasts—the method the FOMC uses to calcu-
late its central tendency.
RESULTS
We compare the forecasts for output and
inflation separately. The FOMC and the private
forecasters used GNP as the measure of output
until 1992, when they switched (along with the
Bureau of Economic Analysis) to GDP. The FOMC
switched among price indices several times:
Specifically, it used the GDP deflator from 1983
through 1988, the CPI from 1989 through 1999,
the PCEPI from 2000 through 2003, and finally
the core PCEPI from 2004 through 2006. The SPF
has included forecasts for both the GDP deflator
and the CPI, but not the PCEPI or its core until
recently; so we use the SPF forecast for the GDP
deflator from 2000 through 2006 because it is
more comparable to the PCEPI than is the CPI.
Note, also, that the FOMC always made an implied
forecast for inflation in the GDP deflator because,
until November 2007, they had made forecasts for
both nominal and real output. We match apples
to apples between the FOMC and SPF projections
where possible—i.e., GDP/GNP deflator to GDP/
GNP deflator for either the full sample or through
1988 and the CPI to CPI from 1989 through 1999.
Output Growth Forecasts
Figures 1 and 2 show the 12-month-ahead
output growth forecasts. Figure 1 shows the full
range and central tendency of FOMC forecasts.
Whenever the central tendency limits coincide
with the limits of the full range, eliminating the
three extreme values does not change the limiting
value. These forecasts reflect the 1990-91 reces-
sion (with a trough in March 1991) but not the
2001 recession (trough in November 2001).
Figure 2 shows the full range and central
tendency of SPF output growth forecasts. In this
case, eliminating outliers makes a big difference
in the size of the range. The range of SPF forecasts
is much wider than that for the FOMC forecasts.
The SPF group is larger, which may account for
some of the difference. But it also appears that
the distributions of SPF forecasts have fatter tails.
A plausible explanation for the more concentrated
distribution of FOMC forecasts is that the policy-
makers get together eight times per year at meet-
ings that include an economic briefing by the
research staff at the Board of Governors. The
purpose of the staff briefing, which includes the
Greenbook forecast, is to provide the FOMC a
common point-of-departure for discussing the
outlook and monetary policy. Furthermore, some
participants may not produce forecasts from
scratch but instead may use the Greenbook as a
benchmark from which to generate an outlook in
sync with their views.
We construct “consensus” forecasts by taking
the midpoints of the range and the CT. Figure 3
plots the midpoint of the CT forecast ranges for
both the FOMC and the SPF. The CTs of both
the SPF and FOMC forecasts are quite similar,
although the SPF forecasts are slightly more
pessimistic about output growth during the late
1980s and recently. Figure 4 shows that the SPF
CT aligns very well with the respective mean and
median output forecast—which would be the
conventional measures of consensus. This align-
ment suggests that the midpoint of the CT for the
FOMC forecasts is probably a good measure of
the group consensus for output growth. Note that,
going forward, one could also construct a con-
sensus that is an approximation to the mean using
histograms (see boxed insert). We did this for the
forecasts made at the October 30-31, 2007, FOMC
meeting and found that this approximation was
always within 5 basis points of the midpoint of
the CT for all the variables forecasted and over
all horizons.
To assess the accuracy of these alternative
forecasts, we calculate the difference between
the consensus forecasts and the real-time data
that were first released. We use the first-released
numbers as the actual because we believe that
these data contain more news than subsequent
revisions and are, therefore, more important for
financial markets. It is also important to use first-
Gavin and Pande
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USING THE HISTOGRAMS TO MEASURE CONSENSUS
In this box we show that one can use the histograms provided with the FOMC forecasts to
construct a consensus forecast that is an approximation of the mean of the individual forecasts.
In Figure B1, we show the GDP forecasts from 2007 to illustrate the method. The histogram shows
the distribution of the 17 forecasts presented at the October 30-31, 2007, FOMC meeting by the
governors and Bank presidents that participated in the meeting. The vertical axis shows the number
of participants whose forecast fell within the different bins. The horizontal axis shows the bins
within each 0.2-percentage-point range. To calculate the weighted average of the bins, we multiply
the number of participants times the midpoint of the bin. So this measure of consensus for real
GDP in 2007 is 2.43 = 3 × 2.25 + 13 × 2.45 + 1 × 2.65.
Note that this is almost exactly equal to the center of the central tendency. In this case it is easy
to see that if we delete the top and bottom three forecasts, all the remaining forecasts are in the
center bin. So the CT forecast is 2.45, the midpoint of this bin. In Table B1 we show the weighted
averages of the bins in the histograms along with the midpoint of the central tendency for all of the
forecasts. The largest difference is only 0.05 percentage points at an annual rate, which further
suggests the usefulness of using the midpoint of the central tendency as the measure of FOMC
consensus.
Table B1
Real GDP Unemployment rate PCE inflation Core PCE inflation
Weighted Midpoint Weighted Midpoint Weighted Midpoint Weighted Midpoint
average of CT* average of CT average of CT average of CT
2007 2.43 2.45 4.76 4.75 2.95 2.95 1.89 1.85
2008 2.18 2.15 4.87 4.85 1.94 1.95 1.84 1.80
2009 2.46 2.50 4.86 4.85 1.82 1.85 1.80 1.80
2010 2.50 2.55 4.84 4.80 1.79 1.75 1.76 1.75











Weighted Average = 2.43
Midpoint 2.2 of CT = 2.45
Figure B1
Real GDP, 2007released data to evaluate policy decisions that
are made before the data are revised.8 We report
forecast accuracy comparisons for the CT only
because the SPF range was a much less accurate
forecast and there is little to distinguish the FOMC
range and CT forecasts. The root mean squared
errors (RMSEs) of the output forecasts are shown
in Table 1.
We report results for the entire period, 1983
through 2006, and for three eight-year subperiods:
1983-90, 1991-98, and 1999-2006. We break up
the sample to show how distribution of individual
forecasts changed over time. In all but the middle
period, the RMSEs of the FOMC output forecasts
were lower than those of the private sector fore-
casts. It is also interesting to note that the RMSE
of the SPF CT output forecast was slightly lower
than the SPF median (the measure of consensus
used by the SPF) in all instances.
Inflation Forecasts
The FOMC inflation forecasts shown in
Figure 5 reflect an ongoing decline in the trend
of inflation through 2000 with temporary upward
deviations in 1989, 1996, and 2006. Figure 6
shows the inflation forecast range and CT for the
SPF survey. Similar to output growth, the disper-
sion of inflation forecasts by the SPF respondents
is much wider than it is for the FOMC. Overall,
the ranges have become narrower since the begin-
ning of the sample.
Figure 7 shows that there is more variation
in the spread between the FOMC and SPF CT
inflation forecasts than we saw in the case for
output growth. Also, the FOMC and SPF CT infla-
tion forecasts are substantially different during
the period after 2000, when the SPF was forecast-
ing inflation in the GDP price index and the
FOMC was forecasting either the PCE price index
or, beginning in 2004, the core PCE price index.
Figure 8 shows that the SPC CT closely matches
the mean and median inflation forecasts—as was
the case for the output forecasts in Figure 4.
In Table 2 we report information on inflation
forecast accuracy during the two periods for
which we have comparable forecasts. During the
period from 1983 to 1988, both forecasted infla-
tion in the GNP deflator. For these six years, the
FOMC had the lowest RMSE, but all are within
0.08 percentage points. During the period from
1989 to 1999, both forecasted CPI inflation. For
these 11 years, the SPF median forecast had the
lowest RMSE, but all are within 0.09 percentage
points. For the period between 2000 and 2006,
the SPF did not forecast either the PCEPI or the
core PCEPI, so no valid comparison can be made.
We use two approaches to deal with the
problem that the SPF did not forecast the PCEPI
or core measure until 2005. First, we note that
Gavin and Pande
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8 The use of first-released data makes it more difficult to compare
our results with those who use third-released data, such as Tulip
and Reifschneider (2007). We realize that using first-released data
is not the best definition of “truth” for evaluating forecast accu-
racy in all circumstances.
Table 1
Accuracy of Output Forecasts
RMSE
Period FOMC CT SPF CT SPF mean SPF median
1983 to 2006 1.17 1.22 1.22 1.24
1983 to 1990 1.24 1.34 1.34 1.36
1991 to 1998 1.20 1.15 1.16 1.19
1999 to 2006 1.08 1.15 1.14 1.17
NOTE: Forecasts were made in late January or early February for the current calendar year. The SPF CT is the central tendency con-
structed by taking the range of individual forecasts after eliminating two outliers (one high and one low) for every six forecasts. RMSE
is root mean squared error.both the SPF and the FOMC make implicit fore-
casts of the GDP deflator. We construct an FOMC
consensus forecast for the output deflator by
taking the difference between the consensus fore-
casts for nominal and real output. To make the
forecasts comparable, we construct an SPF CT
for the GDP deflator in the same manner. Table 3
presents the results from the comparison of these
forecasts. In contrast to the results in Table 2, we
see that the SPF CT generally has a lower RMSE
than does the FOMC CT. The difference is due
in part to how the forecasts are constructed. In
Table 2, both the FOMC and SPF are making
explicit forecasts of the GDP deflator. In Table 3,
the implicit forecasts will, in general, not yield
the same value as an explicit forecast because
the process of removing outliers separately from
nominal and real GDP does not require that the
outliers come from the same individual.
The second way that we attempt to take
account of the differences in forecast accuracy
that may be attributed to the difference in the
indices is to document differences in the accuracy
of random walk forecasts for each of the indices
used by the Fed. Table 4 reports the RMSEs for
the random walk forecasts for the full sample
period and each of the subperiods considered in
Tables 2 and 3. The top four rows construct the
fourth-quarter-over-fourth-quarter forecast for
the current calendar year using the real-time data
fourth-quarter-over-fourth-quarter growth rate
of the previous year (which is first reported in
January). As far as we know, there is no record of
first-released real-time data for first-released core
PCEPI before August 2000.9 Among the other
three, the RMSE of the GDP deflator forecast is
always lower than the RMSEs for the CPI and the
PCEPI. By comparing the real-time random walk
forecasts for the GDP deflator with the results in
Table 3, we find, as did Atkeson and Ohanian
(2001) and others, that the random walk forecast
was quite good in recent periods.The CPI always
has the highest RMSE, and is, in this sense, the
most difficult to forecast. Except for the period
1983 to 1990, the RMSE for the core PCEPI was
always lowest among these inflation measures.
In this sense, it has been the easiest to predict.
We also report the RMSEs using the current
vintage data (shown in the bottom four rows of
Table 4). The core PCEPI has the least amount of
Gavin and Pande
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9 The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis maintains the monthly
releases for the PCEPI and core PCEPI back to the August 1, 2000,
release. Quarterly releases of PCEPI are available back to the
January 19, 1996, released date. See the ALFRED database at
http://alfred.stlouisfed.org/category?cid=21.
Table 2
Accuracy of Inflation Forecasts
RMSE
Period FOMC CT SPF CT SPF mean SPF median
1983 to 1988 0.85 0.93 0.89 0.90
1989 to 1999 0.79 0.88 0.83 0.78
NOTE: The FOMC made projections for the GNP deflator during the period 1983-88 and the CPI for 1989-99.
Table 3
Accuracy of Indirect GDP Deflator Forecasts
RMSE
Period FOMC CT SPF CT
1983 to 2006 0.77 0.71
1983 to 1990 0.97 0.90
1991 to 1998 0.60 0.67
1999 to 2006 0.68 0.47
NOTE: To make the comparison as close as possible, we calcu-
lated the CT for both the FOMC and SPF CT forecasts for the
GDP/GNP deflator as the difference between the CT forecasts
for nominal GDP and those for real GDP.uncertainty by this measure. The GDP deflator is
the next-easier to predict and, again, the CPI
proves most difficult. Note that the SPF has
begun to publish forecasts for both PCEPI and its
core measure in 2005.
CONCLUSION
By increasing the frequency of their forecasts
to four times per year and by extending the fore-
cast horizon to 3 years, Federal Reserve policy-
makers have taken an important step forward in
providing information about their views of the
current economic situation and the long-run
trends.
We use the individual forecasts from the SPF
to construct the range and central tendency sta-
tistics that are analogous to those reported by the
FOMC. We find that the midpoint of the central
tendency coincides closely with both the mean
and median of the forecasts. We conclude, there-
fore, that the midpoint of the FOMC central ten-
dency is probably a reliable measure of the
policymakers’ consensus.
Comparing the history of the year-ahead fore-
casts made by the FOMC participants in February
to similar forecasts made by the SPF, we find
mixed results when testing for relative accuracy
among the alternative consensus forecasts. The
sample sizes are too small for reliable tests of
statistical significance. Yet, FOMC forecasts of
real GDP growth perhaps are somewhat more
accurate than those of the SPF, and SPF forecasts
of inflation as measured by the output deflator
are somewhat more accurate than those of the
FOMC in the most recent period. There is less
dispersion (or disagreement) among the FOMC
forecasts than we see in SPF forecasts; but this
policymaking body (and the number of forecasts)
is smaller and, unlike the individuals in the SPF,
the FOMC participants regularly attend meetings
in which they receive a common economic brief-
ing from the Federal Reserve Board staff.
Although this study addresses the issue of
relative forecast accuracy, we agree with
Reifschneider and Tulip (2007), who argue that
too much emphasis may be put on the relative
accuracy of different forecasts. Even the forecast
Gavin and Pande
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Table 4
Accuracy of Random Walk Inflation Forecasts
GDP deflator CPI PCEPI Core PCEPI
Real-time data
1983 to 2006 0.63 1.32 1.17 0.67
1983 to 1990 0.70 1.52 1.46 1.00
1991 to 1998 0.57 1.30 1.10 0.45
1999 to 2006 0.61 1.13 0.86 0.37
December 2007 vintage data
1983 to 2006 0.68 1.32 0.90 0.57
1983 to 1990 0.83 1.52 0.93 0.72
1991 to 1998 0.52 1.30 0.99 0.50
1999 to 2006 0.64 1.13 0.76 0.45
NOTE: The forecast is equal to the real-time fourth-quarter-over-fourth-quarter inflation rate from the previous year (first available
in the second half of January). The CPI is not revised so the real-time data is also current vintage. The real-time GDP deflator data are
calculated from the nominal and real GDP numbers reported in the real-time data set on the Philadelphia Fed web site:
www.philadelphiafed.org/econ/forecast/real-time-data/index.cfm. The CPI data are from Haver/USECON database. PCEPI data are
taken directly from reports of the Survey of Current Business. We thank David Reifschneider and Peter Tulip for supplying the real time
core PCEPI data. Note that, unlike the other real-time data we use, these are third-release “final” values published in March. The
December 2007 vintage data are taken from the Haver/USECON database for all the measures of inflation.errors of a poorly performing forecast will be
positively correlated with the smaller errors of
better forecasts. Making a forecast requires pur-
poseful analysis of the details of the economy and
is probably the best way to understand changes
in the current stage of the business cycle. Policy-
makers who are also forecasters are likely to learn
from their mistakes and better understand when
and why policy changes are needed. In our view,
there is a substantial value in the FOMC’s fore-
casting process that lies in the knowledge it adds
to those who participate in making forecasts and
in the information it sends to the public about
policy assumptions and objectives.
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